Research

If interested, you can find links to most of my published work below. Lately, I’ve been working on a number of related papers that will hopefully figure in a book on knowledge-first epistemology.  (I’ll include parts of 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11 from below. Much of this book will draw on some unpublished work having to do with the rational roles of knowledge and perception.)  I’m also working on a textbook with Adam Carter, a handbook of evidence with Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Trent Dougherty, a proposal for a book on justification with Brent Madison, and papers on things like pragmatic encroachment, the role that normative reasons (known and otherwise) should play in our normative theories, and the significance of normative or moral uncertainty.

Monograph

Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University Press.

Edited Collection

Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Co-edited with John Turri. Oxford University Press.

Papers, Chapters, and Encyclopedia Entries

  1. Objectivism and Subjectivism about Justification in Epistemology. Forthcoming in Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn. Cambridge University Press.
  2. Stop Making Sense? On A Puzzle about Epistemic Rationality. Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. [Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize of 2015.]
  3. Who Cares What You Accurately Believe? Forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives 29, Epistemology.
  4. Just Do It? When to Do What You Judge You Ought to Do. With Julien DutantSynthese.
  5. Reasons and Theoretical Rationality. Forthcoming in D. Star (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
  6. Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence? Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research as part of a symposium on Daniel Star’s Knowing Better (Oxford University Press)
  7. When Ignorance is No Excuse. With Maria Alvarez. Forthcoming in P. Robichaud and J. Wieland (ed.), Responsibility-The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press.
  8. Evidence and its Limits. Forthcoming in C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting (ed.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
  9. The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology. Forthcoming in J. Dunn and K. Ahlstrom-Vij (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
  10. How and Why Knowledge is First. Forthcoming in A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (ed.), Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
  11. A Plea for Epistemic Excuses. Forthcoming in F. Dorsch and J. Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press.
  12. La Verdad en el Gnosticismo. Forthcoming in Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica.
  13. Knowledge and Normativity. In S. Hetherington and M. Valaris (ed.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy.
  14. Knowledge and Awareness. Analysis (2015) 75: 596-603.
  15. Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism. Symposion (2014) 1: 77-87.
  16. Learning from Learning from our Mistakes. In M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (ed.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter.
  17. Fake Barns and False Dilemmas. Episteme (2014) 11: 369-89.
  18. Pritchard’s Reasons. Part of a symposium on Epistemological Disjunctivism in Journal of Philosophical Research. Forthcoming.
  19. Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth. Erkenntnis (2014) 79: 1355-65.
  20. Potency and Permissibility. In B. Bramble and B. Fischer (ed.), Stirring the Pot: The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. Oxford University Press.
  21. Are Epistemic Reasons Reasons to Promote? Logos and Episteme (2013) 3: 353-60.
  22. A Note Concerning Justification and Access. Episteme (2013) 10: 369-86.
  23. The Russellian Retreat.  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2013) 113: 293-320.
  24. The Unity of Reason. In C. Littlejohn and J. Turri (ed.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.
  25. Don’t Know, Don’t Believe: Reply to Kroedel. Logos and Episteme (2013) 4: 231-38.
  26. No Evidence is False. Acta Analytica 28 (2013): 145-59.
  27. Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions. Logos and Episteme 3 (2012): 509-14.
  28. Disagreement and Defeat. In D. Machuca (ed.) Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge, 2012, pp. 169-93.
  29. Does ‘Ought’ Still Imply ‘Can’? Philosophia 40 (2012): 821-8.
  30. Morality and Reasons for Action. In H. LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
  31. Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2011): 603-19.
  32. Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (2011): 35-48.
  33. Moral Knowledge by Intuition. In J. Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism. Continuum, 2011, pp. 106-28.
  34. Evidence and Knowledge. Erkenntnis 74 (2011): 241-62.
  35. Reasons and Belief’s Justification. In A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen (ed.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 111-31.
  36. Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese 179 (2011): 479-500.
  37. Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2010): 79-100.
  38. Must We Act Only On What We Know? Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 463-74.
  39. The Externalist’s Demon. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2009): 399-435.
  40. ‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Practical Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2009): 363-73.
  41. Critical Notice of Michael Zimmerman’s Living with UncertaintyPhilosophical Books.
  42. On the Coherence of Inversion. Acta Analytica 24 (2009): 127-37.
  43. On Treating Something as a Reason for Action. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2009): 1-4.
  44. The New Evil Demon Problem. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu.
  45. From E = K to Scepticism? The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 679-84. 3350 words.
  46. Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? The Reasoner 1 (2007): 6-7.

Works in Progress (Drafts Soonish)

  1. Paper on relationship between defeaters and reasons. For volume on defeaters.
  2. Paper on pragmatic encroachment and decision-theory.
  3. Paper on perceptual particularity and predication.
  4. Paper on evidence and knowledge in the criminal law. For volume on Ernest Sosa’s epistemology.
  5. Assertion and Moore’s Paradox. In S. Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
  6. Gettier Cases and Evidence. In S. Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Press.
  7. Knowledge and Evidence. For T. Dougherty, M. Lasonen-Aarnio, and C. Littlejohn (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
  8. This is Epistemology. (With Adam Carter).
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