Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University Press.
Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Co-edited with John Turri. Oxford University Press.
Papers, Chapters, and Encyclopedia Entries
Stop Making Sense? On A Puzzle about Epistemic Rationality. Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. [Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize of 2015.]
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe? Forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives 29, Epistemology.
Reasons and Theoretical Rationality. Forthcoming in D. Star (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Can Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence? Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research as part of a symposium on Daniel Star’s Knowing Better (Oxford University Press)
Evidence and its Limits. Forthcoming in C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting (ed.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology. Forthcoming in J. Dunn and K. Ahlstrom-Vij (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press
How and Why Knowledge is First. Forthcoming in A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (ed.), Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
A Plea for Epistemic Excuses. Forthcoming in F. Dorsch and J. Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Awareness. Analysis (2015) 75: 596-603.
Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism. Symposion (2014) 1: 77-87.
Fake Barns and False Dilemmas. Episteme (2014) 11: 369-89.
Pritchard’s Reasons. Part of a symposium on Epistemological Disjunctivism in Journal of Philosophical Research. Forthcoming.
Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth. Erkenntnis (2014) 79: 1355-65.
Potency and Permissibility. In B. Bramble and B. Fischer (ed.), Stirring the Pot: The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. Oxford University Press.
Are Epistemic Reasons Reasons to Promote? Logos and Episteme (2013) 3: 353-60.
A Note Concerning Justification and Access. Episteme (2013) 10: 369-86.
The Russellian Retreat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2013) 113: 293-320.
The Unity of Reason. In C. Littlejohn and J. Turri (ed.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.
Don’t Know, Don’t Believe: Reply to Kroedel. Logos and Episteme (2013) 4: 231-38.
No Evidence is False. Acta Analytica 28 (2013): 145-59.
Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions. Logos and Episteme 3 (2012): 509-14.
Disagreement and Defeat. In D. Machuca (ed.) Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge, 2012, pp. 169-93.
Does ‘Ought’ Still Imply ‘Can’? Philosophia 40 (2012): 821-8.
Morality and Reasons for Action. In H. LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2011): 603-19.
Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (2011): 35-48.
Moral Knowledge by Intuition. In J. Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism. Continuum, 2011, pp. 106-28.
Evidence and Knowledge. Erkenntnis 74 (2011): 241-62.
Reasons and Belief’s Justification. In A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen (ed.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 111-31.
Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese 179 (2011): 479-500.
Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2010): 79-100.
Must We Act Only On What We Know? Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 463-74.
The Externalist’s Demon. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2009): 399-435.
‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Practical Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2009): 363-73.
On the Coherence of Inversion. Acta Analytica 24 (2009): 127-37.
On Treating Something as a Reason for Action. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2009): 1-4.
From E = K to Scepticism? The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 679-84. 3350 words.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? The Reasoner 1 (2007): 6-7.