Most of my work is in epistemology and ethical theory. The one big idea that I’ve defended over my career is that we can only understand how there can be categorical requirements (such as those (typically) associated with morality) if we embrace a radical and unorthodox externalism in epistemology. On my view, you cannot have false, justified beliefs about what you ought to do (and this requirement, in turn, generalizes to beliefs about non-normative matters.) (You can find some discussion of this transcendental argument for externalism here and here. You can find more of it (with a focus on epistemic norms) here.)
Lately I’ve been working on general reasonology and knowledge-first epistemology. Some of this is on the ontology of reasons (here) and some is on the role(s) that normative reasons should play in our theories of justification and obligation (here and here). Some of this is on why we should think that knowledge is the norm of belief (here).
This summer I’ll probably finish textbooks on epistemology and metaepistemology.
Before coming to London, I received my PhD in Philosophy from the University of Nebraska (where I worked mainly with Mark van Roojen, John Gibbons, Robert Audi, and Al Casullo), taught for a few years at SMU (and a semester as an adjunct at TCU but they don’t get a link. (They couldn’t be bothered to get a spare key to let me in my office so I had to hold office hours on a bench)), taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and got a lovely dog. In my free time, I try to catch up on mindless admin.