Most of my work is in epistemology and ethical theory. One big idea that I’ve defended over my career is that we can only understand how there can be categorical requirements (such as those (typically) associated with morality) if we embrace a radical and unorthodox externalism in epistemology. On my view, you cannot have false, justified beliefs about what you ought to do (and this requirement, in turn, generalizes to beliefs about non-normative matters.) (You can find some discussion of this transcendental argument for externalism here and here. You can find more of it (with a focus on epistemic norms) here.)
Lately I’ve been working on general reasonology and knowledge-first epistemology. Some of this is on the ontology of reasons (here) and some is on the role(s) that normative reasons should play in our theories of justification and obligation (here and here). Some of this is on why we should think that knowledge is the norm of belief (here).
This summer I’ll probably finish an introduction to epistemology (with Adam Carter) and start work on a new monograph on knowledge-first epistemology.
Before coming to London, I received my PhD in Philosophy from the University of Nebraska (where I worked mainly with Mark van Roojen, John Gibbons, Robert Audi, and Al Casullo), taught for a few years at SMU (and a semester as an adjunct at TCU), taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and got a lovely dog. In my free time, I like to do philosophy.